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Volkmer: Medical Malpractice Statute Which Prevents Tolling of Limitations

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-DISABILITY OF INFANCYMedical Malpractice Statute Which Prevents Tolling of
Limitations During Infancy Violates Due Process Clause
of Texas Constitution
Sax v. Votteler,

648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
Eleven year old Lori Beth Sax was operated on by Dr. T.P. Votteler to
remove her appendix in May, 1976. The parents of Lori Beth, individally
and as next friend of their daughter, brought suit against Dr. Votteler in
February, 1979, alleging that he had negligently removed a fallopian tube
instead of the appendix.2 At trial, Dr. Votteler relied on the provision in
the Texas Insurance Code3 which limited malpractice actions to two years
from the date of last treatment by the physician.4 The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.5 The court of appeals affirmed, 6 finding no equal protection violations, and ruling that the Saxes'
due process argument had not been properly preserved for appeal.7 The
I. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1983).
2. See id at 663.
3. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82 (Vernon 1975) (repealed 1977).
4. Id § 4. Section 4 of article 5.82 provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no claim against a person or hospital covered by a
policy of professional liability insurance covering a person licensed to practice medicine
or podiatry or certified to administer anesthesia in this state or in a hospital licensed
under the Texas Hospital Licensing Law, as amended (Art. 4437f, Vernon's Texas Civil
Statutes), whether for breach of express or implied contract or tort, for compensation
for a medical treatment or hospitalization may be commenced unless the action is filed
within two years of the breach or the tort complained of or from the date the medical
treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is
made is completed, except that minors under the age of six years shall have until their
eighth birthday in which to file, or have filed in their behalf, such claim. Except as
herein provided, this section applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal
disability.
Jd
5. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1983).
6. See Sax v. Votteler, 636 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982), a/jdinpart,
reversed and remanded in part, 648 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1983).
7. See id at 465. The lower court ruled that the Saxes had not raised due process, and
specifically the "Open Courts Provision" of article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution, as
a defense to Dr. Votteler's motion for summary judgment. The lower court added, however,
that even if considered, the due process question would not compel reversal of the trial
court. See id at 465.
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Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error.8 Held-Affirmed in part, reversed andremandedin part. A medical malpractice statute which prevents
tolling of limitations during infancy and purports to bar a minor's9 cause of
action violates the due process clause of the Texas Constitution.
Statutes of Limitation have been employed for centuries to discourage
lawsuits which are based on stale or fraudulent claims.' ° A recognized
consequence of such a limitation is that there may be some legitimate
plaintiffs who will be denied recovery." Nevertheless, courts generally enforce the limitation statutes when applicable, relying on the legislature's
determination of how such a class of cases should be treated.' 2 As the statutes developed, they began to vary according to the underlying causes of
action being asserted. 3 In addition, exceptions to the general rules of limipersons on whom the limitatation were promulgated to accomodate those
4
tions would create an obvious hardship.'

8. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1983).
9. See id at 667.
10. See R. SOHM, THE INSTITUTES 282-84 (J. Ledlie trans. 3rd ed. 1970) (outlining the
general laws of limitation in Roman law); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations,
63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1177-79 (1950) (noting early history of limitations in Roman, English, German, and Swiss law); see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983) (requiring plaintiff in medical malpractice actions to give sixty days notice
to defendants before filing suit); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50A (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983) (requiring plaintiff in Deceptive Trade Practice actions to give thirty days notice
in order to recover treble damages). Notice statutes are a statutory method of more recent
origin used to discourage non-meritorious claims. By requiring plaintiffs to notify potential
defendants of any contemplated legal action, the parties are encouraged to negotiate and
make offers of settlement before their dispute is brought into court. See Comment, An Analysis of the 1979 Deceptive Trade PracticesAct and Possible Ram ications of Recent Amendments. Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 885, 907 (1980) (noting how
amendments which limit damages if notice is not given promote negotiation).
11. See Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977) (exclusion of legitimate
claims "an unfortunate, occasional by-product").
12. See, e.g., Kavanaugh v. Noble, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947) (statutes of limitation
strictly construed by judiciary and act to "cut off rights, justifiable or not"); Demchuk v.
Duplancich, 440 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ill. 1982) (upholding Dram Shop Act limitation of one
year, citing legislature's choice not to amend in 18 years); Littlefield v. Hayes, 609 S.W.2d
627, 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ) (discovery rule court-created and may be
abolished by legislature). But see Aljadir v. University of Penn., 547 F. Supp. 667, 669 (E.D.
Penn. 1982) (equitable tolling may be applied to extraordinary situations); Henderson Clay
Products, Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assoc., Inc., 451 A.2d 174, 175 (N.H. 1982) (statute protecting class of persons by limitation held unconstitutional).
13. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon 1975) (personal injury causes of
action limited to two years); id art. 5527 (debt causes of actions limited to four years); see
also J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES §§ 589-90 (1929) (noting varied types of pleading which
developed with statutes of limitation).
14. See, e.g., McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (limitation on attorney malpractice tolled as long as attorney-client relation-
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Infancy has long been regarded as such an exception, and the enforcement of legal deadlines has consequently been tolled during the minority
of the person in question. 5 The concept of tolling became necessary because the courts recognized that minors have a common law right to sue
others in certain actions but lack the legal capacity to sue until they are
adults.' 6 The exception of disability of infancy thus acts to preserve a minor's cause of action until he or she is recognized as an adult at law and
has the opportunity to initiate the legal process in his or her own capacity. 7 Texas has recognized the disability of infancy since 1841,18 and its
across-the-board application has been withdrawn only in very limited
instances.19

The field of medical malpractice is one instance where the disability of
infancy has been made inapplicable by a legislative act.2" During the
1970's, malpractice litigation and the resulting liability of physicians and
hospitals increased dramatically. 2' Finding malpractice insurance costs ex-

ship exists); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1980, no writ) (false imprisonment cause of action accrues when imprisonment ends); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (providing for disabilities of
minority, married persons under 21 years of age, imprisonment and insanity); see also J.
ANGELL, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW 194-207 (1869) (accounting for the more famil-

iar disabilities as well as disability of slavery or persons "beyond the seas").
15. See, e.g., Lacy v. Williams, 8 Tex. 182, 187-88 (1852) (minor heir's suit for recovery
of property tolled during infancy); McCulloch v. Renn, 28 Tex. 793, 797 (1866) (minor's suit
for recovery of slaves not barred by limitation); Law of Feb. 5, 1841, art. 997, § 11, 1841 Tex.
Gen. Laws 163, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 630 (1898) (providing for tolling of limitations until majority).
16. See Texas Utils. Co. v. West, 59 S.W.2d 459, 461 (lex.Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933,
writ ref'd) (minor has cause of action for wrongful death of parent); Fall v. Webber, 47
S.W.2d 365, 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932, writ refd) (defendant's attempt to join actions of injured child and parent not allowed).
17. See, e.g., Cox v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 665 F.2d 566, 572 (5th Cir. 1982) (minor could bring wrongful death cause of action even if mother's claim was barred); Doran v.
Compton, 645 F.2d 440, 452 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant's motion for summary judgment
based on limitation denied, minority of plaintiff preserves claim); Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. School Dist., 554 F. Supp. 974, 982-83 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (limitations tolled in civil
rights action brought by minor).
18. See Law of Feb. 5, 1841, art. 997, § 11, 1841 Tex. Gen. Laws 163, 2 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 630 (1898).

19. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (current statute limiting tolling for malpractice actions of minors to twelve years of age); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (four year limit for initiation of paternity suits not tolled by infancy).
20. See TEX. INS. CODE art. 5.82 (Vernon 1975) (repealed 1977).

21. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. AMNN. art. 4590i, § 1.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83) (legislature's findings of increased claims as basis for malpractice insurance act); see also Redish,
Legislative Response to the MedicalMalpracticeInsurance Crisis. ConstitutionalImplications,
55 TEXAS L. REV. 759, 760 (1977) (citing example of premiums increasing 100 percent be-
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cessive or even prohibitive, doctors and insurers lobbied in the state legislatures for relief.22 The legislative responses varied widely, but most
statutes incorporated some combination of a limitation on the amount of
recovery,23 a limitation on the time in which a malpractice action can be
25
filed, 24 and/or the creation of a medical panel or arbitration board. Of
those statutes which employed time limitations, many specifically provided
that actions brought by minors against health care providers should be
tolled only for an abbreviated time, notwithstanding other laws which may
toll limitations until majority.2 6 State courts have generally upheld medical malpractice statutes containing such provisions when subjected to re27
view under the federal and state constitutions.
Prior to 1975, Texas courts struggled with the application of the discovery doctrine to tort cases involving physicians.2 8 In that year, the Texas
legislature enacted the Professional Liability Insurance for Physicians,

tween 1974 and mid-1975); Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis,
36 MD. L. REV. 489, 490-91 (1977) (referring to specific insurance company's claims rising
over 130 percent in six years).
22. See Birnbaum, Physician's Counter-Attack. Liability of Lawyersfor Instituting Unjustifed Medical MalpracticeActions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1975) (noting physicians' petitioning for legislative redress); Higgs, Physician's Countersuits: A Solution To The
Medical MalpracticeDilemma 28 DRAKE L. REV. 81, 81-82 (1977) (noting growth of physician activism and the growing use of countersuit).
23. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Burns 1983) ($500,000 aggregate limit on recovery); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42B(1) (West 1977) ($500,000 limit on recovery).
24. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482 (1977) (general two year limitation; minors younger
than four have until eighth birthday); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-564 (1982) (general three

year limitation; minors younger than seven have limitation run from age seven); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6856 (Supp. 1982) (general two or three year limitation; minors younger than
six have limitation run from age six).
25. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 201-214 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (state arbitration
board utilized for malpractice claims); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 (Burns 1983) (malpractice plaintiffs required to submit claim to medical review panel); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.47 (West Supp. 1983) (plaintiffs required to submit claim to medical review panel);
see also Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 749 (Ariz. 1977) (constitutionality of medical
review panel upheld). Medical review panels and arbitration boards have been challenged
on grounds of right to trial by jury, see id at 749; equal protection, see id at 750-51; as an
impermissible judicial comment on the evidence, see id at 749, 750; and as an usurpation of
the judicial function of the courts, see id at 750.
26. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (minors under 10 have
until 12th birthday); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Baldwin 1982) (minors under 10
have until 14th birthday); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983) (minors under 12 have until 14th birthday).
27. See Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hosp., 403 So. 2d 158, 160-62 (Ala. 1982) (statute limiting minor's time to bring suit constitutional); Baird v. Loeffier, 433 N.E.2d 194, 19596 (Ohio 1982) (minor's claim barred by limitation, reasonable time of one year after limiting statute in effect).
28. See Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20-21 (Tex. 1977) (in a 5-4 decision,
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Podiatrists, and Hospitals Act (referred to hereinafter as the 1975 Liability
Act).2 9 This Act required that malpractice claims be brought within two
years from the alleged tort or its last related treatment. 3' The 1975 Liability Act further provided that the disability of infancy preserved a cause of
action only until a child's sixth birthday from which time the limitation
begins to run. 3 These provisions were codified as article 5.82 of the Texas
Insurance Code, and were challenged and upheld in the Texas courts of
appeal.32 In 1977, the Texas legislature passed the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act (referred to hereinafter as article 4590i) to replace the medical malpractice sections of the Insurance Code.3 3 Article

Supreme Court of Texas ruled discovery doctrine not applicable to claim of misdiagnosis by
defendant physician).
29. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82 (Vernon 1975) (repealed 1977).
30. See Delgado v. Burns, 650 S.W.2d 505, 506-07 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.)
1983, no writ) (discovery doctrine does not apply to foreign objects since 1975 Liability Act
has set absolute time limit). But see Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. 1977)
(discovery rule still applies to actions based on foreign objects left in body, vasectomies, and
excessive x-ray exposure); Nelson v. Krusen, 635 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982,
no writ) (citing discovery rule exceptions of Robinson). The cause of action in Robinson had
accrued before the 1975 Malpractice Act was in effect. See Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d
18, 19 (Tex. 1977). Delgado and Nelson appear to be in direct conflict in interpreting how
cases such as those described in Robinson are affected by the 1975 Liability Act. The Delgado court ruled that the 1975 Malpractice Act destroyed court-created discovery rules pertaining to medical malpractice actions, but made no reference to the decision in Robinson.
See Delgado v. Burns, 650 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ).
The Nelson court ruled the exceptions of Robinson were controlling, and would continue to
be effective until the Supreme Court ruled otherwise. See Nelson v. Krusen, 635 S.W.2d 582,
584-85 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ); cf. Newberry v. Tarrin, 594 S.W.2d 204, 206-07
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
31. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82 (Vernon 1975) (repealed 1977).
32. See Littlefield v. Hayes, 609 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no
writ); Wallace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322, 323-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, writ refd n.r.e.). InLittlefield, the plaintiff was seven months late in filing suit, and the
court of appeals ruled that the action was barred, stating article 5.82 had a rational basis and
the court would defer to the finding of the legislature. See Littlefield v. Hayes, 609 S.W.2d
627, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ). In Wallace, the plaintiff brought suit for
the wrongful death of his father which had occurred in 1961. Although the plaintiff had filed
suit two days before his twentieth birthday, the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the
two year limitation ran from the effective date of the new 1975 Liability Act, and not from
the plaintiffs eighteenth birthday, thereby making his claim late by three weeks. See Wallace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ
ref d n.r.e.). Presumably, Sax and Wallace are not in conflict because the plaintiff in Wallace did not plead a violation of article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution. See id at 324.
The Supreme Court made no mention of Wallace in the Sax opinion; however, it is evident
that Wallace is no longer controlling on this issue. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667
(Tex. 1983).
33. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Section 10.01
provides:
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4590i, the statute currently in effect, tracks the language of its predecessor,
but provides that minors under twelve have until their fourteenth birthday
to file a malpractice claim.3 4
In Sax v. Vole/er,3 the minor plaintiff and her parents challenged the
constitutionality of section 10.01 of the 1975 Liability Act.3 6 The pleading
by a minor of a due process violation distinguished the facts in Sax from
the earlier decisions of the courts of appeal.3 7 The Sax decision did not
rely on any previous case concerning medical malpractice.3" In an opinion
written by Justice Kilgarlin, the supreme court concluded, without dissent, that article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution3 9 confers "additional rights" of access to the courts which, in this instance, were
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years of the occurrence of the breach or tort or from
the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the
hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed; provided that minors under
the age of 12 years shall have until their 14th birthday in which to file, or have filed in
their behalf, the claim. Except as herein provided, this subchapter applies to all persons,
regardless of minority or other disability.
Id § 10.01.
34. See id § 10.01. The provision limiting a minor's claim has yet to be challenged.
See Borderlon v. Peck, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 494 (July 6, 1983); Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp.
of Dallas, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466 (June 25, 1983). In Borderlon, the lower courts ruled that
article 4590i had eliminated fraudulent concealment as a defense to limitations and that the
legislature had created an absolute time limit in which to bring an action. See Borderlon v.
Peck, 643 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982), rev'd and remanded, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 494 (July 6, 1983). In a 5-4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the principles of
equitable estoppel were to be applied, notwithstanding the absolute language of the statute.
See Borderlon v. Peck, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 494, 495 (July 6, 1983). The dissent supported the
position of the court of appeals, and expressed concern that the ruling by the majority would
make the limitation section of article 4590i meaningless. See id at 496-97. In Schepps, the
appellants challenged the sixty day notice requirement of article 4590i. The trial court
granted summary judgment on the grounds that notice had not been given, and the court of
appeals affirmed. See Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Dallas, 638 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1982), arfd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466 (June
25, 1983). The Supreme Court ruled that, although the notice requirement was mandatory, it
did not destroy the plaintiff's cause of action. See Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Dallas,
26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466,469 (June 25, 1983). The failure of the plaintiff to give notice resulted
in an abatement of the cause for sixty days, and the cause was remanded to the trial court.
See id at 469.
35. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
36. See id at 644.
37. See Littlefield v. Hayes, 609 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no
writ) (challenge to limitation of 1975 Liability Act by adult); Wallace v. Homan & Crimen,
Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (minor plaintiff
did not plead due process in challenging 1975 Liability Act limitation).
38. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
39. See TEX. Co NsT. art. I, § 13. Section 13 provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts
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unreasonably denied.' The test used by the Sax court was that a plaintiff
must show that a common law right to bring suit has been abridged, and
that the abridgment was unreasonable when weighed against the purposes
of the statute in question.4 In applying this rationale to the instant case,4 2
the court first noted that a minor has a right to recover in a personal injury
case, and that this right is not the same as the parent's right to recover
damages.43 Secondly, since a minor could not bring suit in his own name
until his disability has been removed, the limitation requires the minor to
rely on parents or a legal guardian for timely legal action." Such a reliance in effect restricted a minor's common law right to bring an action into
court.4 5 The right to bring suit for personal injury outweighed the need to
reduce the potential liability of health care providers, and as a result, the
court found that a violation of due process existed.46 The parents of Lori
Beth were properly barred, however, by the defense of limitations from
suing for damages which they had incurred, and that part of the lower
court's opinion was affirmed.4 In concluding, the court specifically set out
the damages Lori Beth could potentially recover if her claim was upheld at

shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law." Id
40. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983).
41. See id at 664-65. The court cited Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex.
1977) (use of legislative continuance violated right of immediate redress); Lebohm v. City of
Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Tex. 1955) (city ordinance requiring notice of any street
defect before it was liable for injury is unconstitutional); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 48
S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex. 1932) (city ordinance requiring notice of street defect before claim can
be filed ruled unconstitutional) as examples of how article I, section 13 had been previously
interpreted. None of the above cases dealt with a limitation of action, but instead were examples of laws which were overturned because they unreasonably inhibited due process in
obtaining legal redress under the Texas Constitution, article I, section 13. See Waites v.
Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. 1977); Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 275 S.W.2d 951,
952 (Tex. 1955); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 48 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex. 1932).
42. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983).
43. See id at 666; cf. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 250-51 (Tex. 1983). In
Sanchez, the supreme court overturned its longstanding pecuniary loss rule in wrongful
death actions. Previously, parents who sued for the wrongful death of their child were limited in their recovery to what income the child could have generated less the cost of raising
the child. See id at 251. The court followed the lead of Selders v. Armentrout, 207 N.W.2d
686, 688-89 (Neb. 1973) and other decisions allowing parents to recover for mental anguish
and for loss of society and companionship. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252
(Tex. 1983). This decision is another reflection of how the Texas Supreme Court is changing
its views in order to treat minors as individuals, rather than as an asset or a liability to their
parents. See id at 252, 253.
44. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983).
45. See id at 667.
46. See id at 667.
47. See id at 667.
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trial.48
The Supreme Court of Texas in Sax has taken a realistic and reasonable
approach in resolving a conflict between common law rights and statutory
limitations. 49 The conclusion is sound: those persons under the disability
of infancy have a right to bring common law actions, and the abrogation of
this right is considered unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.5" The
court arrived at this conclusion by first finding that the due process issue
had been preserved for review.5 Although framed in the language of
equal protection, the Saxes' pleading did state the issue of a minor's due
process right to bring a claim and this question should have been considered by the lower court.5 2 The Supreme Court went on to review the statute in light of the Texas Constitution and found article 5.82 to be
unconstitutional only to the extent necessary to eliminate the due process
problem.5 3 The purposes of the 1975 Liability Act were also briefly discussed.54 The main concern of the court was the right of a minor to bring a
cause of action into court without being dependent upon another individ48. See id at 667.
49. See id. at 667.
50. See id at 667; cf. In re J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. 1982). In J.A.M, the
Texas Supreme Court held that a provision of the Family Code which limited the initiation
of paternity suits to one year from the birth of the child was unconstitutional. See id at 732.
This provision was repealed in 1981 and replaced with a four year limitation. See TEx. FAM.
CODE § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The Texas Supreme Court withheld its opinion in
J.A.M until the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982). In Mills, the Supreme Court found the one year limitation of paternity actions in Texas to be violative of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which four other justices
joined, to emphasize the majority opinion should not be interpreted to mean the present four
year Texas statute was constitutional. See id at 102. The Texas Supreme Court made reference to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, but reserved its opinion as to any possible
implications. See In re J.A.M., 631 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. 1982).
51. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1983).
52. See Sax v. Votteler, 636 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982), af'd in
part, rev'd and remanded inpart, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983). The lower court relied on Rule
166-A(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part: "Issues not
expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not
be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal." TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c). See Sax v.
Votteler, 636 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982), aftd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
53. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983); cf. Grove Mfg. Co. v. Cardinal Const. Co., 534 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (entire Workmen's Compensation Act challenged as violative of article I, § 13, but
court reviewed only as to question of arbitrariness).
54. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983); cf. Schepps v. Presbyterian
Hosp. of Dallas, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466, 469 (June 26, 1983). In Schepps, the supreme court
interpreted the notice statute of article 4590i and placed great emphasis on the legislative
history of the Act. See id at 469.
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ual's adult standing." The court sharpened its focus when reviewing a minor's claim and rendered a decision on the basis of the plaintiffs having
independent, individual rights, and not simply those which are ancillary to
her parent's rights and actions. 6 Thus, the minor's right to toll limitations
is not merely an equitable principle, but is guaranteed under the Texas
Constitution. 7
The Supreme Court's concern for plaintiff's rights was also present in
Schepps v. PresbyterianHospitalof Dallas, 8 a decision rendered only six
weeks after Sax. In Schepps, the trial court concluded that dismissal of a
malpractice claim was proper. when it was shown that the plaintiff had
failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement.5 9 The Supreme
Court, relying on the stated purpose contained in article 4590i itself,6 °
found that dismissal was "an undue restriction" of the plaintiff's right to
sue.6 The Schepps opinion demonstrates the tendency of the Texas
Supreme Court to interpret a statute so that a cause of action will be preserved, if the statutory language may be so construed.6 2 Thus, the tendency
of the court to protect a claimant's cause of action applies to both constitutional review and interpretation of state statutes, as evidenced by the opinions in Sax and Schepps.6 3 Taken together, Sax and Schepps are strong
plaintiff cases which counteract to some degree the procedural defenses of
55. Cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 31.01, 31.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (allowing minor to be legally emancipated at age 16 upon positive finding by court). Once emancipation
of the minor has occurred, the disabilities of minority may be removed for some or all
purposes. See id § 31.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Some argue the age of possible
emancipation should be as young as 14 years of age. See Comment, The UncertainStatus of
the Emancipated Minor." Why We Need a Un!form Statutory Emancpation of Minors Act
(USEMA), 15 U.S. F. L. REV. 473, 483 (1981).
56. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983).
57. See id at 667; cf. Texas Dept. of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S.W.2d 519, 522
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (paternity action tolled during infancy since
cause of action accrued before limitation was enacted). The one year limitation for bringing
a paternity suit was held not to be retroactive and the four year statute was held to be
applicable. The Dallas court then found the disability of infancy to apply, noting the importance of the minor's ability to bring his or her own action upon majority. See id at 522; see
also Solender, Family Law.- Parent and Child, 34 Sw. L.J. 159, 170 (1980) (importance of
tolling limitations in paternity suits since fundamental rights of child involved).
58. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466, 469 (June 25, 1983).
59. See id at 466-67; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01 (Vernon Supp. 19821983) (plaintiff "shall" notify all potential defendants of claims sixty days before filing suit).
60. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANNi. art. 4590i, § 4.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
61. See Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Dallas, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466, 469 (June 26,
1983).
62. See id at 469; see also Salvaggio v. Brazos City Water Control, 598 S.W.2d 227, 229
(Tex. 1980) (rules of appellate review liberally construed in favor of appellant).
63. See Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Dallas, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466, 469 (June 26,
1983); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983).
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notice and limitations in medical malpractice actions.64
One obvious ramification of the Sax decision concerns the constitutionality of article 4590i, the present statute which places limitations on malpractice actions.65 The tolling limitation for minors filing claims has been
raised from six to twelve years of age.66 If the Sax rationale is to be followed, it is difficult to perceive how the new statute is any more reasonable
than the previous provision of the 1975 Liability Act.67 After Sax, the only
acceptable version of such a medical malpractice statute appears to be one
which does not affect common law disabilities. 68 If this reasoning is extended, it is difficult to conceive of any cause of action belonging to a minor which would not be tolled, in view of the due process analysis used by
the court in Sax. 69
A second and less immediate effect of the instant case is on malpractice
insurance rates. 70 The 1975 Liability Act represented an attempt to draw
some boundaries around a treating physician's liability so that medical
malpractice insurance costs could be kept within reason. 7 ' The practical
effect of the Sax ruling is to increase physicians' liability, especially if they
are treating infants or children. Pediatricians, for example, will become
greater insurance risks because they will be exposed to many more years of
liability per patient than the adult practitioner. 72 One solution to this une-

64. See Schepps v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Dallas, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 466, 469 (June 26,
1983); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1983).
65. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
66. See id. § 10.01.
67. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
5.82 (Vernon 1975) (repealed 1977).
68. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983). The court also noted that
there are no alternative remedies for the type of claim raised in the instant case. See id at
667. In other causes of action in which a minor's claim is limited, such as paternity suits, at
least some alternative remedy is available. For example, the State of Texas sponsors Aid for
Dependent Children (AFDC) which is designed to provide funds where child support payments by a father are not available or are insufficient. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§ 31.005 (Vernon 1980).
69. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983). The court did state that the
right of the individual and the legislative basis of a law will be balanced, indicating that a
crisis or a condition of sufficient magnitude within the state could outweigh a minor's right
to toll limitations. See id at 665-66. Apparently medical malpractice insurance and its related effects were considered such a crisis in 1975. See id at 666. More recently, the number
of claims has dropped but the amount of damages awarded has increased. See Davis, Physician's Perspective, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 331, 331 (1979).
70. See Littlefield v. Hayes, 609 S.W.2d 627, 629-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980,
no writ) (finding establishment of standards for health care liability as a rational basis for
the statute).
71. See id at 629-30; see also Doran v. Compton, 645 F.2d 440, 450 (5th Cir. 1980)
(citing need to lower insurance rates as main concern for passage of 1975 Liability Act).
72. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983). The court lists as possible
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ven distribution of liability would be to implement provisions used in
other states.7 3 In Illinois, for example, after the medical malpractice statute
was found to be unconstitutional,7 4 the state enacted a law creating an
arbitration board for malpractice claims." Since article 4590i is not due to
expire until 1993,76 another solution would simply be to revise or eliminate
section 10.01 so that a full minority may be tolled. Any method of reducing malpractice liability, however, will be challenged in court, since it will
in some way limit the injured party's common law right to sue.7 7
The practice of tolling the statute of limitations for the disability of infancy is not new in itself, but the concept behind the statute has been revitalized by the decision in Sax. By employing the Texas Constitution, the
Supreme Court of Texas grants due process protection to minors, guaranteeing them the ability as well as the right to bring a cause of action.7" In
doing so, the Supreme Court has foreclosed one of the legislative alternatives utilized to combat the continued rise in medical malpractice liability.
ChristopherJ Volkmer

damages recoverable by the minor: "physical pain and mental anguish, both past and future, disfigurement, loss of earning capacity after she attains the age of eighteen years, any
medical expenses she may in reasonable probability incur after her eighteenth birthday, and
any other damages peculiar to her." Id at 667.
73. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 6.03 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (creation of Texas Medical Disclosure Panel); id § 11.02 (limitation of $500,000 on recovery).
The Texas Medical Disclosure Panel was created for the purpose of determining which medical operations require disclosure in suits based on informed consent. See id § 6.03. The
provision limiting damages to $500,000 "does not apply to the amount of damages awarded
on a health care liability claim for the expenses of necessary medical, hospital and custodial
care received before judgment or required in the future treatment of the injury." Id
§ I1.02(b).
74. See Wright v. DuPage Hosp. Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-46 (Ill. 1974). In Wright,
the Illinois Supreme Court found a number of limiting devices unconstitutional, including
the $500,000 limit recovery, the medical review panel, and mandatory renewal of malpractice insurance by insurers. See id at 739-46.
75. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 201 (Smith-Hurd 1983).
76. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
77. See Wright v. DuPage Hosp. Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d 736, 739-46 (II. 1976).
78. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

